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Contemporary Indonesian politics is characterized by inequality. Scholars of 
oligarchy have provided the most cogent analysis of Indonesia's extraordinarily 
unequal distribution of material wealth as a central feature of Indonesian politics. They 
have also pushed forward the comparative analysis of national political systems by 
using the Indonesian case to conceptualize oligarchy as a category of political analysis.* 1 
These analyses draw attention to the manifest weaknesses of Indonesian democracy, 
and highlight the differences between the formal rules and procedures that constitute 
democracy, and the exercise of power under democratic rule.
Pluralism is an alternative framework through which to analyze Indonesian 
politics. Pluralism shares with Marxist and other materialist analyses of politics a 
"socially determinist"2 conception of politics. It rejects the position that material 
interests are fundamentally different from other interests, with fundamentally different 
consequences for political action. The weaknesses of early pluralist analyses are well- 
known: they offered a theoretical framework, not a theory of anything; pluralism as a 
concept is most fruitfully applied to the static analysis of existing cleavages rather than 
to the dynamic analysis of where cleavages come from and why they persist or change;
* Special thanks to Michele Ford and Matt Winters for comments on an early draft.
1 Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics o f Oligarchy in an Age of 
Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); andleffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).
2 Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New 
Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97,2 (1982): 259.
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and most seriously, the conception of power (and of interest itself) typically affirmed 
by a pluralist analysis is one dimensional and reductive.3 For these reasons, many 
recent analyses of contemporary Indonesian politics working outside of the oligarchic 
tradition have ignored or downplayed their pluralist heritage.
This essay explores the complementarities and the tensions between pluralism and 
recent analyses of oligarchy in Indonesia. Its goal is to argue that a "critical" pluralism 
offers a toolkit through which to understand Indonesian politics, as well as a 
progressive research program that can push the analysis of material wealth and 
political power further than existing research on oligarchy. This open dialogue 
between pluralist and oligarchic analyses contributes to the study of material wealth 
and political power (in Indonesia and elsewhere) in three ways. Conceptually, it helps 
analysts distinguish between descriptive and causal claims about material wealth, 
political power, and political outcomes. Theoretically, it challenges oligarchic analyses 
by offering competing and complementary causal arguments about the effects of the 
unequal distribution of material resources. Methodologically, it outlines a practice of 
knowledge production for scholars of Indonesia interested in effects of material wealth 
on contemporary Indonesian politics, one that invites structured comparison with 
other national contexts or historical periods and clarifies the role of evidence in 
adjudicating among contending approaches.
My use of the qualifying term "critical" here is deliberately nonstandard.4 Rather 
than serving as a dogwhistle for structural or materialist theories of politics, it is meant 
as an internal challenge to theories of pluralism themselves, one that follows from the 
weaknesses outlined above and seeks to address them by questioning why cleavages 
exist and why interests are or are not articulated; this enables scholars to move beyond 
one- and two-dimensional analyses of power and interest, and to take history and 
social structures seriously.5 None of these pluralist auto-critiques is original to this 
essay, yet they have not been articulated in sustained conversation with the empirics of 
contemporary Indonesia for two decades.6 In my usage, "critical" also rejects the search 
for a single master narrative in Indonesian politics, and recommends a practice of 
Indonesian political studies that is concerned first and foremost with middle range
3 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
41 borrow the term "critical pluralism" from Gregor McLennan, Marxism, Pluralism, and Beyond: Classic 
Debates and New Departures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 43-56. Here, McLennan makes passing 
reference to Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom's critique of conventional pluralist analyses of the United 
States political economy. McLennan is also the source of the term "conventional pluralism," as discussed 
below.
5 Gabriel Almond has argued that the early pluralist literature was far more conceptually advanced than 
its later critics have allowed, implying that most of these critiques were actually well understood as early 
as the 1950s. For a review, see the chapter by Gabriel A. Almond, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and 
Professional Memory," in A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science, ed. Gabriel A. Almond 
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 173-88.
6 Stefan Eklof has observed a general decline of theoretical debate among models of Indonesian politics by 
the late New Order period: Stefan Elkof, Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI) and the Decline o f the New Order (1986-98) (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003), p. 11. 
This may reflect the exhaustion of these debates, or a general shift from a focus on typological theory to 
quantitative measurement in comparative politics; see David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, 
"Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor," Political Research 
Quarterly 65,1 (2012): 217-32.
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theory in the service of social explanation.7 Pluralism, like any other approach to social 
analysis, is strongest when it recognizes the limits of its explanatory power.
Because pluralism is not a theory that predicts any particular outcome, it cannot be 
falsified or tested. However, a critical pluralism produces hypotheses in the study of 
material wealth in Indonesian politics that can be falsified through empirical analysis. 
Political conflict during Indonesia's financial crisis and local economic governance in 
decentralized Indonesia offer two topical studies through which to contrast pluralism 
and oligarchy as explanatory frameworks for key issues in contemporary Indonesian 
politics in which massive inequalities in wealth feature prominently.
The essay proceeds as follows. It first traces a brief history of pluralist theory in 
comparative political analysis, and then highlights applications of pluralism to the 
analysis of Indonesia's political economy in the New Order period. From this review, it 
will become clear that, much as scholars of United States politics concluded in the 
1960s, pluralist analyses of anything approaching "interest-group liberalism" in 
Indonesia are inappropriate.8 From there, I move to a direct engagement with the 
concept of oligarchy as presented by Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison and Jeffrey 
Winters, outlining the points of tension between oligarchic and pluralist analyses. 
Building on that discussion, I next present the two topical case studies. In each, I begin 
with what I interpret to be the useful strengths of an oligarchy-based approach to 
contemporary problems in Indonesian politics, before then introducing the problems 
that a pluralist critique inevitably raises and the solutions that it provides. The essay 
concludes by discussing how Indonesianists should build a progressive, cumulative 
research program9 to study Indonesian politics without ignoring the extraordinarily 
unequal distribution of wealth or its corrosive effects on the functioning of Indonesian 
democracy.
Pluralism in Indonesian Politics
The essence of pluralism is a conception of politics as competition among pressure 
groups that represent various interests in society.10 Pluralism has changed significantly
7 Daniel Ziblatt, "Of Course Generalize, But How? Returning to Middle Range Theory in Comparative 
Politics," American Political Science Association-Comparative Politics Newsletter 17,2 (2006): 8-11.
8 The classic statement of this critique in the United States context is Theodore M. Lowi, The End of 
Liberalism, revised ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 1979).
9 Here, I mean "progressive" in the standard Lakatosian sense; see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos 
and Alan Musgrave (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970): 91-196.
10 Even though pluralism was a dominant current in the political science mainstream for most of the 
twentieth century, it was never definitively articulated as a theory of politics by any of the major scholars 
associated with it. Before the conceptual debate on pluralism and its alternatives declined in the 1990s, in 
fact, critics commonly observed that pluralism had no core principles upon which its adherents commonly 
agreed; see Grant Jordan, "The Pluralism of Pluralism: An Anti-theory?," Political Studies 38,2 (1990): 286- 
301; and McLennan, Marxism, Pluralism, and Beyond, p. 35. Commenting on Arend Lijphart's analysis of 
consociationalism, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba observe that "it was widely recognized 
that the concept of pluralism was often used in conflicting ways, none clear or concrete enough to be 
called a theory. Ronald Rogowski's description of pluralism as a 'powerful, deductive, internally 
consistent theory' ... is surely the first time it has received such accolades." See Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Importance of Research Design in Political Science," American Political 
Science Review 89,2 (1995): 480, note 3.
84 Thomas B. Pepinsky
over the past six decades; here, I outline its evolution only briefly.11 As originally 
developed, pluralism had both descriptive and normative ambitions, and was used not 
only to characterize the nature of political conflict but also to legitimize the practice of 
democratic life.12 Later analyses, led by Robert Dahl (himself a key figure in early 
pluralist debates), began to separate the descriptive from the normative components of 
a pluralist analysis of politics. While these scholars remained deeply committed to a 
normative analysis of democratic politics in capitalist states,13 their critical analysis of 
pluralism as a descriptive framework became more tightly focused on characterizing 
the essential axes of political conflict within different polities.14
While a useful corrective to the most idealistic and unreflective pluralist analyses, 
Dahl's most critical approach to pluralism did not save this tradition from losing 
intellectual currency as political scientists transitioned away from paradigmatic 
debates in comparative politics. Theodore Lowi's critique of "interest-group 
liberalism" in the United States also helped to bury conventional pluralism.15 However, 
the pluralist impulse to characterize politics and the policymaking process as 
competition among groups defined by their interests in policy outcomes has survived. 
This is most apparent in the lineage of Mancur Olson's The Rise and Decline of Nations, 
which used Olson's earlier writings on collective action and group behavior to explore 
how distributional coalitions shaped politics and policy.16 Here, the break from the 
normative aspirations of early pluralism is complete, for Olson's analysis was skeptical 
that "pressure groups" were representative of anything resembling the public interest, 
and that their competition would have salutary effects on national politics or on 
economic performance.17 Important comparative works following (more or less 
conspicuously) in this theoretical tradition concerned with distributional politics, in 
which sectoral and class interests shape politics and policy, include Peter Gourevitch 
on politics after economic crises, Ronald Rogowski on trade and political alignments,
11 A recent, textbook-style overview of the pluralist tradition and its contemporary successors can be found 
in John S. Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy, Theories o f the Democratic State (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 35-56 and 131-203.
12 The standard reference is David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1951).
13 Most notably, see Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1985).
14 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," Comparative Politics 10,2 (1978): 191-203.
15 Lowi, The End of Liberalism. Andrew McFarlane labels Lowi's alternative as "plural-elitist theory." 
Distributive and redistributive politics remain essential to this conception of politics and policymaking; 
see Andrew S. McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America," British Journal o f Political 
Science 17,2 (1987): 129-47.
16 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New 
Flaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
17 Flarmon Zeigler, "Interest Groups," in Encyclopedia o f Government and Politics, ed. Mary Hawkesworth 
and Maurice Kogan (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), pp. 377-92. Public choice theory draws on similar 
insights, but has grown to encompass a general critique of interventionist government as hopelessly 
captured by special interests; the standard reference is James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The 
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 1962). This "Virginia school" public choice critique of regulation or activist government does not 
follow logically from a pluralist ontology of political conflict. Olson himself "complained that'the value of 
the scientific contributions of Gordon Tullock and his colleagues in the Virginia School is obscured when it 
is treated as a part of or a justification for any right-wing ideology.'" See Iain McLean, "The Divided 
Legacy of Mancur Olson," British Journal of Political Science 30,4 (2000): 657.
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and Jeffry Frieden on Latin American political economy.18 Distributional politics 
figures also prominently in later analyses of economic development, economic reform, 
and public policy, even if business, sector, or factor interests are only partially 
determinant of these outcomes.19
The important conclusion is that the pluralism of mid-century North Atlantic 
political science has been discarded almost entirely, rendered obsolete by both internal 
critiques (Dahl) and external critiques, both moderate (Lowi) and radical (Lukes). 
Pluralism's intellectual heritage survives, however, in the analysis of distributional 
politics. My understanding of pluralism as applied to contemporary Indonesian 
politics begins from the perspective that political actors engage in politics to produce 
policies that they favor. Political conflict results from differences in the interests of 
various actors, both individuals and groups. Political outcomes are shaped by the 
resources available to conflicting groups and the institutions that aggregate or channel 
individual or collective preferences. These institutions are themselves subject to 
manipulation by the actors and groups whom or which they are meant to constrain, 
such that conflict about political institutions reflects more basic conflicts over 
distribution, redistribution, and recognition. There is no reason to believe that such 
conflict will always produce balanced or socially optimal policy outcomes, that 
"interest groups" as conventionally understood always exist, or that the recognizable 
interest groups that do exist are representative of the interests that they may claim to 
represent.
Modified Pluralisms and the New Order Political Economy
Conventional pluralism was never a serious analytical framework for Indonesian 
politics. However, pluralism did shape the research agenda on the New Order. The 
problem was how to square the observation that Suharto's regime faced no significant 
threat from any organized opposition group with the observation that it was possible 
to uncover clear evidence of distributional politics with effects on policy outcomes; in 
areas ranging from financial deregulation to rice and sugar policy, relatively weak 
groups and interests were able to shape policy outcomes in their favor, and executive 
preferences rarely determined policy outcomes alone.20 The search for pluralism in 
New Order politics was reinforced by parallel currents in the study of communist 
Europe, which sought to demonstrate the utility of a pluralist conceptual framework
18 Jeffry A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965- 
1985 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative 
Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald 
Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
19 See, for example, Richard F. Doner, "Limits of State Strength: Toward an Institutionalist View of 
Economic Development," World Politics 44,3 (1992): 398-431; Stephan Flaggard, Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben 
Ross Schneider, "Theories of Business and Business-State Relations," in Business and the State in Developing 
Countries, ed. Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997): 36-60; 
and Hector E. Schamis, "Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America," 
World Politics 51,2 (1999): 236-68.
20 See R. William Liddle, "The Politics of Shared Growth: Some Indonesian Cases," Comparative Politics 19,2 
(1987): 127—46; and M. Hadi Soesastro, "The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia," Asian Survey 
29,9 (1989): 853-69.
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for sharpening the analysis of politics under communism.21 Thus emerged what might 
be termed the "modified pluralisms" in the study of the New Order political economy.
Modified pluralisms bring together the concept of group competition with some 
other feature of the New Order political system—traditionally, either its extensive 
bureaucracy or its top-down political system—to describe a hybrid political system. 
Examples include "bureaucratic pluralism" as used by Dwight King and Donald 
Emmerson,22 John Bresnan's "managed pluralism,"23 and Hadi Soesastro and Peter 
Drysdale's "constrained pluralism."24 Bureaucratic pluralism is perhaps the most 
theoretically developed of these modified pluralisms, drawing on a long theoretical 
lineage that Emmerson traces to early writings by Juan Linz.25 In this way, the 
modified pluralisms drew from theoretical models that had been first elaborated to 
understand the postwar authoritarian regimes of southern Europe and Latin America.
These analyses also reveal a fundamental concern with policy as central to political 
conflict. The analytical focus on policy outcomes was certainly dominated by economic 
concerns, but material resources and economic interests occupy no special position in 
the modified pluralist analyses of Indonesia or in the pluralist literature that was 
evolving at the same time.26 That said, the relationship between the modified 
pluralisms and the broader concept of pluralism (or of, say, bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism27) has never been outlined with much precision.28 It is not clear if the 
modified pluralisms are diminished subtypes of pluralism (such as pluralism minus 
electoral democracy) or proper subtypes of authoritarianism (authoritarian rule plus 
identifiable group conflict).29 In general, the problem hindering the comparative 
analysis of the New Order regime in pluralist terms has been the difficulty of 
describing the conceptual features of pluralism that scholars remove when they 
employ "bureaucratic" and other modifiers. This problem recalls the earlier critiques of 
pluralism as a theoretical framework without a coherent set of foundational principles 
upon which all of its adherents or proponents agreed.
21 For a review, see Gabriel A. Almond with Laura Roselle, "Model Fitting in Communist Studies," in A 
Discipline Divided, ed. G. Almond, pp. 66-116.
22 Donald K. Emmerson, "Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia," Asian 
Survey 23,11 (1983): 1220—41; and Dwight Y. King, "Bureaucracy and Implementation of Complex Tasks in 
Rapidly Developing States," Studies in Comparative and International Development 30,4 (1995/1996): 78-92.
23 John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1993).
24 M. Hadi Soesastro and Peter Drysdale, "Survey of Recent Developments," Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic 
Studies 26,3 (1990): 3—44.
25 Emmerson, "Understanding the New Order," p. 1222; and Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
26 Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited."
27 Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
28 This parallels the general problem of classifying the New Order regime; see Dwight Y. King, 
"Indonesia's New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neopatrimonial Regime, or a Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian Regime: What Difference Does It Make?," in Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen 
Contributions to the Debate, ed. Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, 1982), pp. 104—16.
29 On diminished versus proper subtypes, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with 
Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics 49,3 (1997): 430-51.
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Rescuing pluralism as a tool for understanding Indonesian politics from the 
analytical morass of slippery definitions and diminished/proper subtypes requires a 
different strategy than that found in the modified pluralist approach. Rather than 
describing Indonesian politics as pluralist, modified pluralist, or something else— 
thereby elaborating the position of the entirety of Indonesian politics within a 
typological space—the task of pluralism in modern political economy is to provide a 
tool through which to analyze particular problems in Indonesian politics. That tool is, 
simply, the analysis of interests and their articulation in the political sphere. The utility 
of a pluralist approach in one conceptual or empirical domain need not signal its 
global utility for all questions in Indonesian politics. Proponents of this approach 
ought to be skeptical of their ability to read interests from observed behavior, or from 
actors' and groups' economic or social profiles, and will theorize explicitly 
relationships between interests and particular institutional structures when making 
claims about the effects of interests on policy or other outcomes. Recalling Lukes's 
critique of power, critical pluralism will also be sensitive to "recognitional 
domination," in which the interests of individuals or groups are ascribed to them by 
external actors, social structures, or state institutions.30
Pluralism, then, should not be considered a theory or description of Indonesian 
politics in the way that modified pluralisms were. It is one framework through which 
to organize observations about political conflict in Indonesia, and theorize about the 
origins and consequences of that conflict. Its contribution to the study of material 
resources and political power is twofold. First, it characterizes the objectives of 
materially endowed actors. Second, it places material interests alongside non-material 
interests in order to understand how they interact to shape political action.
Importantly, this is not necessarily an appeal for a more comprehensive or 
inclusive account of Indonesian politics. For scholars of Indonesian politics who reject 
oligarchy as a conceptual framework, one strategy for demonstrating the superiority of 
some alternative conception of Indonesian politics has been to list the facets of 
Indonesian politics that the concept of oligarchy cannot explain. These are bound to be 
many, as the oligarchy theorists are clear that there is much that they do not mean to 
explain—essentially, any source of power that is not material wealth. This "other 
things matter too" approach is not the strategy adopted here, for it neither addresses 
the oligarchy approaches on their own terms nor explains the conditions under which 
material resources do have explanatory power. In what follows, I endeavor to hew 
closely to the perfectly sensible idea that material resources are necessarily at play in 
all aspects of Indonesia's political economy, from national macroeconomic policy to 
local resource conflict.
Oligarchy and Pluralism: Tensions
Understood as an approach to political conflict rather than a type of political order 
or system of power relations, pluralism is not incompatible with oligarchy as defined
30 Lukes, Power, p. 120. Lukes illustrates recognitional domination with reference to Martha Nussbaum's 
analysis of female identity in India, which is defined only in relation to male interests; see Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).
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in Winters's terms as "the politics of wealth defense by materially endowed actors."31 
Oligarchs may be indifferent to policies or political events that do not affect the 
security of their material wealth; here, a pluralist lens may clarify what kind of politics 
follows. Pluralist approaches may explain what exactly the battles among oligarchs are 
about when oligarchs line up on different sides of a policy debate. Finally, a pluralist 
analysis could in principle see oligarchs as one group in conflict with one or more 
other groups, especially in cases of what Winters terms "civil oligarchies," in which 
oligarchs have surrendered their arms and are constrained by laws.32
Robison and Hadiz use a different definition of oligarchy to characterize the 
Indonesian case. In their analysis, oligarchy is
Any system of government in which virtually all political power is held by a very 
small number of wealthy ... people who shape public policy primarily to benefit 
themselves financially through direct subsidies to their agricultural estates or 
business firms, lucrative government contracts, and protectionist measures aimed 
at damaging their economic competitors—while displaying little or no concern 
for the broader interests of the rest of the citizenry. "Oligarchy" is also used as a 
collective term to denote all the individual members of the small corrupt ruling 
group in such a system. The term always has a negative or derogatory 
connotation in both contemporary and classical usage.33
This definition is incompatible with conventional pluralism because, in the 
conventional understanding, interest groups and other collective actors who are not 
defined by their wealth nevertheless possess and exercise power. Yet it is wholly 
compatible with the critical pluralism outlined above, just so long as there exists 
identifiable distributional conflict among the "wealthy ... people" that forms the basis 
for political action. Without such conflicts, there is nothing for a pluralist to explain. A 
critical pluralist analysis, in fact, might conclude that what a naive pluralist would 
observe to be conflicting interests groups may really be the manifestations of battles 
among oligarchs and elites that have been strategically "externalized" onto society (a 
phenomenon familiar to any observer of the orchestrated demo in post-Suharto 
Indonesia).
Explaining the political consequences of different configurations of power and 
interest is central to the pluralist tradition. Yet neither oligarchy nor conventional 
pluralism is capable on its own of making causal claims. The typology of oligarchy 
advanced by Winters—in which oligarchies vary by degree of fragmentation, the 
source of coercion, and whether they are wild or tamed—is instructive in this regard.
31 Winters, Oligarchy, p. 7. Elsewhere, Winters and Benjamin Page observe that an oligarchy can exist 
within a broadly pluralist political landscape, as in the United States. See Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin 
I. Page, "Oligarchy in the United States?," Perspectives on Politics 7,4 (2009): 731-51. Any account, pluralist 
or otherwise, of Indonesian politics that denies the existence (real or potential) of a particular politics that 
follows from wealth defense would be, trivially, incompatible with Winters's approach to oligarchy.
32 While this is true in principle, I have no clear sense of what such an analysis would look like in practice. 
Winters and Page are skeptical that treating oligarchs as an interest group makes sense; Winters and Page, 
"Oligarchy?" p. 738.
33 See Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, pp. 16-17, note 6. The original source is Paul M. Johnson, 
"Oligarchy," A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, http: / / www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/oligarchy 
(accessed February 13, 2013).
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There are no claims that emerge from this typology of oligarchies about what different 
oligarchic types cause. Instead, these are constitutive statements about what oligarchic 
types are based on theoretically prior claims about how oligarchs relate to one another 
and to the provision of violence. There are some observations about what oligarchs do 
as a result of the type of oligarchy in which they find themselves. But causal claims 
about the consequences of oligarchy for policy or political outcomes cannot be drawn 
from this typology alone. This weakness, of course, is shared by conventional 
pluralism.
Robison and Hadiz's understanding of oligarchy similarly does not provide causal 
explanations for political outcomes. But it is not an elaboration of the concept of 
oligarchy as a theoretical category, but rather of the practice of oligarchy (as defined by 
the authors) in Indonesia. This description of the Indonesian case is no less theoretical 
than that of Winters, but it stresses the historical development of a structure of political 
power and its changes over time.
However, despite the compatibility of both conceptions of oligarchy and what I 
have described as critical pluralism, it is not true that oligarchy and pluralism are 
orthogonal theoretical projects. This makes the relationship between oligarchy and 
pluralism different than the relationship between oligarchy and democracy, which 
both Hadiz and Robison and Winters hold to be compatible.34 Critical pluralism makes 
demands on the analysis of oligarchy, political power, and material inequality in 
Indonesia. For scholars working in the pluralist tradition, any attempt to study politics 
without reference to policy and its consequences is incomplete. Here, policy is 
understood simply as "a principle or course of action adopted or proposed as 
desirable, advantageous, or expedient."35 Policy is central to the pluralist tradition 
because it is the object of political contestation. It can be as broad and substantive as a 
social democratic party platform, or as narrow and venal as directing a regulator to 
harass a business competitor.36 Policies have direct effects (for example, on the business 
competitor who is harassed) and indirect effects (for example, on the investment 
decisions of potential market entrants who anticipate being harassed themselves). In 
the pluralist tradition, a progressive research program in Indonesian political studies 
would be one that produces theories of political outcomes and policy choices, and that 
can explain why policies and outcomes vary across time and space through falsifiable 
hypotheses derived from these theories.
34 In the conventional understanding, the association between pluralism and democracy is definitional. 
Dahl is absolutely clear: "all democratic countries are pluralist democracies"; see Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas 
of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 5. While 
theoretically important for the pluralist tradition, this point is ultimately of little consequence for the 
current purposes of characterizing politics in countries marked by vast inequality of material resources. A 
committed materialist might argue that the associations that are relatively autonomous in pluralist 
democracies like Indonesia are simply those that lie outside of the interests of oligarchs or economic elites.
35 This is a standard dictionary definition, "policy, n.l," OED Online (Oxford University Press, December 
2012), http:/ / www.oed.com/view/Entry/146842?rskey=uMAZca&result=l&isAdvanced=false (accessed 
February 10, 2013).
36 Note, further, that policies may be coherent or contradictory; that policies may be pursued by politicians, 
their supporters, or by segments of society that are entirely disenfranchised; and that policies may even be 
illegal.
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The study of corruption in post-Suharto Indonesia illustrates the differences 
between typological theory and causal explanation, and, accordingly, the differences 
between approaches rooted in oligarchy versus the pluralist tradition. Oligarchy 
theorists have noted that the power of Indonesia's super-wealthy has been 
"reorganized" rather than reduced since the transition to democracy.37 In Winters's 
typology, Indonesian oligarchy is transforming from a sultanistic oligarchy towards an 
"untamed ruling oligarchy."38 Related observations about the structure of elite politics 
and political business relations (the term "oligarchy" is not used) in the early post-New 
Order period were made separately by Andrew MacIntyre and Ross McLeod, both 
considered to be working in different theoretical traditions than scholars of oligarchy.39 
Focusing on corruption, each argues that the basic logic of money politics changed 
after the New Order's demise. MacIntyre and McLeod, however, propose hypotheses 
to explain how different organizations of elite politics or political business relations 
affect the overall level and structure of corruption. They imply, following canonical 
models of the industrial organization of corruption,40 that without any mechanism for 
binding the grasping hands of thousands of lower-level politicians and administrators, 
bribes in post-Suharto Indonesia are smaller in size than they were during the New 
Order but more frequent in number. As a consequence, corruption in post-Suharto 
Indonesia has threatened investment more than corruption under the New Order did, 
at least at the time that MacIntyre and McLeod were writing.41
I am not aware of any test of this hypothesis, and the available evidence supporting 
it is impressionistic and incomplete, supported by anecdotes and blanket 
pronouncements of what "everybody knows." However, MacIntyre and McLeod's 
arguments are consistent with a research program that moves from a descriptive 
account of the changing organization of money politics to a causal account of its effects 
on investment in post-Suharto Indonesia. This is an argument that can be falsified, 
though it is true that no systematic attempt to do so has been initiated to date.
In sum, the points of tension between analytical approaches based on oligarchy and 
critical pluralism lie not in the conceptualization of oligarchy or in the analytical focus 
on the social foundations of political conflict, but rather in the focus on policy as the 
object of political contestation and the development of causal explanations for political 
outcomes. These tensions are consequential for the study of Indonesian politics. The 
following section expands on this theme, presenting two topical studies of political 
conflict in Indonesia in the context of massive inequality in material wealth and 
political power.
37 Thus the title of Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power.
38 Winters, Oligarchy, p. 181.
39 Andrew MacIntyre, "Institutions and the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries," 
paper presented at the "Workshop on Corruption," Stanford University, January 31-February 1, 2003; and 
Ross H. McLeod, "Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption," Agenda 7,2 (2000): 99-112.1 make 
no claim that either would be comfortable being labeled as a (critical) pluralist, or even as working in a 
pluralist tradition or framework. Their insights, however, are wholly compatible with my approach to 
constructing a pluralist analysis of corruption in Indonesia.
40 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics 108,3 (1993): 599-617.
41 Both authors saw Indonesia's legal system as completely ineffective.
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Oligarchy and Pluralism at Work
To demonstrate that a focus on oligarchy alone occludes fundamental questions of 
politics and policymaking, I examine here two of the central political issues of the past 
twenty years of Indonesian history: the economic crisis of 1997-98 and local political 
economies in decentralized Indonesia. In the case of the crisis, I argue that even 
ignoring non-material interests entirely, a pluralist approach provides the only 
theoretical framework that can capture the conflicts concerning policy adjustments 
within the New Order coalition that set in motion the collapse of the Indonesian 
economy and, ultimately, of the New Order regime. In the case of decentralization, I 
show that the effects of material resources on political conflict are always conditional 
on non-material factors, making it impossible to understand the effects of material 
inequality in isolation from the conditions under which resources are deployed.
Material Interests, Adjustment Policy, and Regime Change
By the early 1990s, most analysts of the New Order had come to agree that Suharto, 
as an individual, wielded extraordinary political power. In characterizing the system of 
rule over which Suharto presided, scholars of oligarchy draw attention to a tiny cohort 
of extremely wealthy businessmen (they were nearly all men) whose economic 
position depended on their close personal relationships with Suharto and who 
amassed fortunes of truly staggering size. These scholars, like those working in other 
traditions, identified these wealthy figures as the movers and shakers of the 
Indonesian economy during the New Order. The personal lives and business empires 
of figures such as William Soeryadjaya and Liem Sioe Liong, in fact, could be used to 
chart the evolution of Indonesia's entire political economy.42 A central argument in 
Robison and Hadiz is that many of these powerful individuals were remarkably 
successful in protecting not only their wealth but also their political position during the 
course of Indonesia's democratic transition, something that the most Pollyannaish 
analysts of Indonesia's democratic transition might not have expected. For his part, as 
noted above, Winters argues that the politics of wealth defense in Indonesia is in the 
process of moving from a sultanistic oligarchy towards an "untamed ruling 
oligarchy"43 in which money is at the core of politics, but in a different way than it had 
been under the New Order.44 The approaches therefore agree that Indonesia oligarchy 
has changed, but not been eliminated, through democratization.
If interest groups, trade associations, labor groups, and others do not effectively 
lobby or campaign on enduring issues or coherent platforms, then the conventional 
pluralist framework of interest group competition is not appropriate for characterizing 
Indonesian politics, at least at the national level. However, even if analysts stay
42 Marleen Dieleman and Wladimir M. Sachs, "Coevolution of Institutions and Corporations in Emerging 
Economies: How the Salim Group Morphed into an Institution of Suharto's Crony Regime," Journal of 
Management Studies 45,7 (2008): 1274—300; and Yuri Sato, "The Astra Group: A Pioneer of Management 
Modernization in Indonesia," The Developing Economies 34,3 (1996): 247-80.
43 Winters, Oligarchy, p. 181.
44 This "less genteel game of bagi-bagi" compares with Aspinall's analysis of the proyek (project); see 
Edward Aspinall, "A Nation in Fragments: Patronage and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia," 
Critical Asian Studies 45,1 (2013): 27-54.
92 Thomas B. Pepinsky
focused on the national level, careful analysis of distributional politics in the pluralist 
tradition is necessary to understand the most important events in Indonesia's modern 
history since the consolidation of the New Order in 1971: the collapse of the Indonesian 
economy in 1997 and of the New Order in 1998.
As I detail elsewhere, the Asian Financial Crisis did not generate a free-for-all 
among those who would be labeled as oligarchs, nor a unified rejection of Suharto's 
regime by oligarchs and political and business elites,45 nor did it simply disrupt a 
fundamentally flawed political-economic model.46 It generated a specific distributional 
conflict between two fractions of capital owners: those with fixed and mobile capital.47 
At the root of the conflict was a disagreement regarding how to adjust to the crisis, 
featuring two technically incompatible adjustment policy packages with different 
distributional implications. The group of individuals who would be labeled as 
oligarchs were one set of actors, divided between the two fractions, but the fractions 
included more modest business interests as well. Distributional conflict therefore both 
divided the oligarchs and created common cause between oligarchs and less 
spectacularly wealthy actors.
This perspective reveals that the manifestly ineffective policy response of the New 
Order's final year in office was far from irrational or ideological.48 Instead, it was 
fundamentally political—the low politics generated by the oligarchs and small 
businesses alike trying to avoid going out of business. The problem was of their own 
making, with firms having become overextended and borrowers having ignored 
exchange rate risk when obtaining loans denominated in foreign currencies. And the 
conflict was simple: imposing capital controls was directly contrary to the interests of 
mobile capital, but the exchange rate peg and expansionary macroeconomic policy 
stance so desired by local firms rooted in Indonesia would be feasible only with a 
closed capital account.49
45 This is implied by Winters's quote from Rizal Ramli, "Everyone is piling on now and kicking him 
because they know he's down . . . "  Winters, Oligarchy, p. 178.
46 For Robison and Hadiz: "We propose that the crisis eroded the financial and political cement that had 
papered over a profoundly flawed and vulnerable system wholly reliant on the protection of a corrupt and 
authoritarian system of state power and an unregulated engagement with volatile global capital 
markets . . . "  Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power, p. 149.
47 Thomas B. Pepinsky, "Capital Mobility and Coalitional Politics: Authoritarian Regimes and Economic 
Adjustment in Southeast Asia," World Politics 60,3 (2008): 438-74.
48 In an otherwise compelling treatment, Robison and Andrew Rosser mistake the nature of policy conflict 
during the crisis; see Richard Robison and Andrew Rosser, "Contesting Reform: Indonesia's New Order 
and the IMF," World Development 26,8 (1998): 1593-609. Rather than a fundamentally ideological conflict 
between the IMF and "Suharto, the politico-business families, and the major conglomerates" (pp. 1599- 
1603), this was a distributional conflict within the latter about how to escape the crisis without destroying 
the economic resources of some fraction of capital owners. Robison and Hadiz similarly neglect the basic 
conflict within Suharto's ruling coalition when describing IMF (International Monetary Fund) programs as 
"frustrated by resistance from the major politico-business families . . . "  Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising 
Power, p. 157. Managing twin currency and banking crises in any emerging economy requires difficult 
choices about exchange rate and capital account policy. The fact that the IMF mandated a "neoliberal" 
policy package did not make this policy conflict any more serious than it would have been without the 
IMF, as the Malaysian experience shows. See Pepinsky, "Capital Mobility."
49 The cases of Malaysia in 1998 and Chile and Mexico in 1982 demonstrate this solution in action, as well 
as the distributional politics of such a policy response.
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The observation that Indonesia's super-wealthy protected their wealth as much as 
they could during the crisis conveys precisely no information about the nature of that 
most central policy battle. The distributional coalitions activated by the currency crisis 
of 1997 were decidedly not interest groups as conventionally understood, and they did 
not act as coherent actors that aimed to represent some enduring social or economic 
interest. Yet political conflict in the final months of the New Order was fundamentally 
conflict over how to distribute the burden of adjustment across various allies of the 
regime. I further argue that this conflict not only shaped adjustment policy, it 
ultimately tore the regime apart, explaining not only the collapse of Suharto's rule but 
also the manner in which the regime fell.50 But even if the end of the New Order was 
overdetermined—if the "true" cause of its collapse was actually Suharto's senility, the 
mobilization of civil society opposition and brave protesters, the rightful resistance of 
key opposition elites, a revolt within the military, a combination of these, or something 
else altogether—distributional interests are essential for characterizing policy conflict 
during the crisis. There is no other coherent explanation for why the regime would 
pretend to be committed to implementing the IMF's adjustment packages, why 
oligarchs and lower-level business interests would object (and object for the reasons 
that they did), how the distributional coalitions would emerge to contest both the IMF 
and the Suharto regime, and why Suharto or any of his closest cronies would care 
about any of this.
According to scholars working in the oligarchy tradition, the economic crisis led 
elites and oligarchs to fight among each other and eventually to abandon Suharto, an 
analysis that papers over the fundamental conflicts within the regime's coalition. 
Analyses based in the oligarchy tradition also ignore—because they are not equipped 
to observe—the basic observation that most brutal dictatorships temporarily insulate 
themselves from global financial markets when facing unanticipated currency and 
banking crises, using the breathing space to reflate their economies and crush their 
opponents.51 An approach rooted in the pluralist tradition asks, first, what the 
distributional consequences of different adjustment measures are, and, second, which 
political coalitions happen to be empowered (for reasons that can be uncovered from 
the historical evolution of particular regimes). It both explains how adjustment policy 
battles unfolded in Indonesia, and provides a template for comparative analysis of the 
Indonesian case, facilitating direct comparison with both Malaysia during the Asian 
Financial Crisis and certain Latin American dictatorships during the 1980s debt crisis.52
The case of adjustment policy conflict and the collapse of the New Order illustrates 
the power of distributional politics as a framework for understanding the actions of 
even the most powerful and wealthy economic actors in Indonesia. I do not conclude 
from this discussion that a pluralist approach to policy conflict in the New Order's 
final year requires any fundamental rethinking of the theory of oligarchy as articulated 
by either Robison and Hadiz or Winters. Instead, the intensely political struggle over
50 Thomas B. Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in 
Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
51 The case of Malaysia after September 1,1998, is one example. The onset of Malaysia's crackdown against 
its domestic opposition followed by exactly one day the announcement of capital controls and an 
exchange rate peg.
52 Pepinsky, Economic Crises.
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adjustment policy during Indonesia's financial crisis reveals the limits of analyses 
focused on oligarchy for understanding political conflict among Indonesia's most 
extremely wealthy and powerful citizens.
Material Interests, Decentralization, and Local Politics
After democratization, decentralization is the second fundamental change to the 
New Order political economy that occurred after the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Decentralization has empowered subnational political actors in new ways, and placed 
new pressures on local politicians to cater to their constituents' demands. The results 
have been disappointing on a number of fronts: corruption and money politics remains 
rampant, local reforms have stalled, district governments continue to be ineffective, 
and other pathologies abound. Hadiz traces most if not all of these pathologies to the 
basic observation that "predatory" interests at the local level were not disempowered 
by the collapse of the New Order and the democratization and decentralization that 
followed.53 Just the opposite: regime change in Jakarta generated new pressures for 
local elites to use the new powers delegated to them to protect their own political and 
economic interests. Even self-styled reformist outsiders must obey the rules of the 
game of bagi-bagi (sharing around) as Hadiz and Robison and Winters all comment 
when discussing the rise of populist reformer Joko Widodo.54
Scholars working in many theoretical traditions have concluded that 
decentralization has not generated the outcomes that its most strident advocates had 
promised, in some cases providing empirical cases that anticipated the theoretical 
analyses that draw on oligarchy.55 This has been raised in reviews of major critical 
works on local politics and Indonesian democratization, which have noted that the 
balance of existing scholarly opinion on democratization and decentralization has 
always been circumspect in suggesting that the two would produce unambiguously 
positive outcomes in terms of representation or popular welfare, in Indonesia or 
anywhere else.56 So critical political economy does not help much to characterize the 
disappointing outcomes of Indonesian decentralization. The strong insight offered by a
53 Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asian Perspective (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2010).
54 Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, "Political Economy and Oligarchy," this volume; and Jeffrey 
Winters, "Oligarchic Power in Indonesia," this volume.
55 The literature on this topic is now large and developed. Some representative contributions include Iwan 
Jaya Azis and Maria Monica Wihardja, "Theory of Endogenous Institutions and Evidence from an In- 
depth Field Study in Indonesia," Economics and Einance in Indonesia 58,3 (2010): 30-334; Michael Buehler, 
"Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere," in 
Problems o f Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, ed. Edward Aspinall and Marcus 
Mietzner (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 267-85; Blane Lewis, "Tax and 
Charge Creation by Regional Governments under Fiscal Decentralization: Estimates and Explanations," 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39,2 (2003): 177-92; Michael S. Malley, "New Rules, Old Structures, 
and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation," in Eocal Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and 
Democratisation, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2003), pp. 102-16; and Thomas B. Pepinsky and Maria M. Wihardja, "Decentralization and Economic 
Performance in Indonesia," Journal of East Asian Studies 11,3 (2011): 337-71.
56 Michael Buehler, "Review of Nankyung Choi, Eocal Politics in Indonesia: Pathways to Power," Publius: The 
Journal o f Federalism 42,4 (2012): e9; and Marcus Mietzner, "Review of Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in 
Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective," South East Asia Research 19,3 (2011): 669-72.
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critical analysis of wealth defense and predatory elites, rather, is that institutional 
reforms may change the character of local politics without disembedding the local 
elites who occupied positions of power directly prior to the reforms. Those local elites 
"have a large stake in the localisation of power, thus in decentralisation and 
democracy,"57 yet not in popular representation or accountability. I believe that even 
the most skeptical analysts of Indonesian decentralization failed to anticipate the 
importance of this argument for Indonesia today.
A conventional pluralist analysis of local politics as competition among interest 
groups has not been shown to offer much empirical traction in analyses of important 
topics in Indonesian local politics. However, recalling that a critical pluralism should 
question why interests are or are not articulated, should move beyond one- and two- 
dimensional analyses of power and interest, and take history and social structures 
seriously, then pluralism offers the natural framework through which to build an 
account of how local politics varies across Indonesia and why this matters.
Begin first with the problem of interest articulation. Conventional pluralist analyses 
in Indonesia fail because local politics in Indonesia generally does not provide a forum 
for the articulation of group interests, or of anything resembling the public interest 
(assuming such a thing exists). However, some interests are articulated—and, indeed, 
represented—in some contexts. Why? One possibility is that interests are represented 
when the local political and economic elite has a particular structure, such as what 
Christian von Lubke has labeled a "contested oligarchy," in which local elites compete, 
but not too much, allowing some private interests to seek representation.58 Another 
possible explanation is that local elites can choose to seek political support from 
different segments of society, sometimes reaching out to the poor and serving as 
effective representatives.59 Alternatively, Ryan Tans argues that despite the ubiquity of 
money politics in Indonesian local elections, it is possible to identify different types of 
political coalitions in various local contexts: mafias, machines, and mobilizing 
coalitions.60 Mobilizing coalitions are most conducive to interest group representation 
in the pluralist mode, and machines are more likely to provide public goods than are 
mafias. Tans proposes that different coalitions emerge in different circumstances 
depending on the resources, both material and non-material, that are available to local 
politicians. Following this approach, any analysis of money politics that ignores non­
monetary resources at the disposal of local politicians, or the goals for which monetary 
resources are used, will fail to account for this variation.61
57 Hadiz, Localising Power, p. 88.
58 Christian von Lubke, "Striking the Right Balance: Economic Concentration and Local Government 
Performance in Indonesia and the Philippines," European Journal of East Asian Studies 11,1 (2012): 17-44. 
Von Liibke's use of "oligarchy" as the basis for an analytical framework does not correspond to either 
Winters's or Robison and Hadiz's use of the term.
59 Andrew Rosser, Ian Wilson, and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Leaders, Elites, and Coalitions: The Politics 
of Free Public Services in Decentralised Indonesia," Developmental Leadership Program Research Paper 
16, 2011.
60 Ryan Tans, Mobilizing Resources, Building Coalitions: Local Power in Indonesia (Honolulu, HI: East West 
Center, 2012).
61 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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The next step in building a progressive research program from Tans's analysis is to 
delineate the consequences of coalition types for policymaking and political outcomes. 
For example, it could be that mobilizing coalitions secure more public goods than do 
mafias or machines, and that flows of financial resources to constituents are combined 
with mobilizational efforts that recognize and/or reify existing group identities and 
interests. Such an analysis in the pluralist tradition would argue that the determinants 
of interest articulation in Indonesian local politics are only rendered visible by taking 
into account the interaction of material and non-material resources available to local 
politicians. The concept of interaction is critical: it rejects the presumptive defense by a 
materialist scholar that non-material resources are outside of his/her theory's 
explanatory scope. Instead, the importance of material resources always depends on 
non-material factors. By specifying ex ante the determinants of coalition types and the 
consequences of coalitional politics for policies and political outcomes, moreover, such 
accounts can easily be falsified, and readily subject to critical comparative analysis.
All pluralist analyses take history and social structure seriously, but a critical 
pluralism should use history and structure to help understand why interest 
articulation fails. In the context of decentralized Indonesia, this means understanding 
the legacies of authoritarian rule, and the ways in which these shape the resources and 
strategies available to local political actors. Michael Buehler has observed that reform 
and accountability have been hamstrung by the simple fact that old elites continue to 
dominate local politics in the era of decentralization.62 This fact is compatible with an 
oligarchic approach to local political economies, but it is not demonstrative of any 
theory. It might instead reflect the continuity of the Indonesian state,63 which, to use 
Benedict Anderson's colorful language, has continued to "excrete ... personnel in a 
continuous, steady process, often over long periods of time."64 Further complicating 
this analysis is the extraordinary heterogeneity among New Order elites, a category 
that is descriptively simple but conceptually broad and unwieldy precisely because the 
New Order regime so pervaded the public sphere and associational life. This renders 
nearly all post-New Order elites tainted by their association with the New Order 
regime, regardless of their backgrounds or interests or resources or actions in the post- 
Suharto era.65
The pluralist approach recognizes that the presence of New Order holdovers in 
local elections does not convey much information about what they do or how their 
presence affects local politics or policy. It may be that the New Order holdovers are 
unresponsive to the very notion of interest articulation because they were socialized 
under an essentially corporatist model of interest management. It may be that New 
Order holdovers have differential access to material resources, which frees them from
62 On the political and administrative backgrounds of candidates for provincial elections, see Buehler, 
"Decentralisation and Local Democracy"; and Marcus Mietzner, "Local Democracy: Old Elites are Still in 
Power, but Direct Elections Now Give Voters a Choice," Inside Indonesia 17 (2006): 17-18. Based on 
incomplete data, the pattern appears to be similar in district elections; Michael Buehler, personal 
communication, January 2013.
63 Buehler, "Decentralisation and Local Democracy."
64 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42,3 (1983): 477-96, p. 478.
65 See also Tans, Mobilizing Resources, pp. 56-57.
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the need to represent interests in order to ensure their political survival. It may be that 
some kinds of New Order holdovers do not act in the same way: lifetime politicians 
may be different from bureaucrats-turned-politicians. These arguments have different 
implications for variation in local governance across regions, and they have different 
implications for the prospects for reform. Each of these possibilities recognizes the 
New Order's historical legacy as being fundamental to understanding contemporary 
local politics. None follows from the oligarchic approach, or from the observation that 
decentralization reforms did not themselves purge New Order elites from local 
politics.
The final directive for a critical pluralist analysis of local politics in decentralized 
Indonesia is to transcend one- and two-dimensional conceptions of power. Lukes's 
third dimension of power is the power to shape how others understand their own 
interests, which is important for pluralist analyses because it rejects the assumption 
that interests are "real" even if believed to be so by those who claim to be acting upon 
them. This argument has methodological consequences for any analysis of power and 
political conflict, applying equally to pluralism as to any materialist approach to social 
analysis, oligarchy included.66 For a pluralist analysis, the important challenge is that 
the mechanism of interest articulation may be broken through the purposive actions of 
oligarchs and elites, who may not act in the direct sense, by smashing unions or 
imprisoning activists and other movement entrepreneurs, but, more indirectly, by 
creating the conditions of domination (ideological or structural) that ensure that those 
groups that might form common interest associations do not believe it possible or 
desirable to do so.67
This phenomenon has long been a concern for critical political economists—it is at 
the heart of long debates about ideological domination and class conflict in capitalist 
democracies68—and a critical pluralism must take it seriously. Yet critical pluralism is a 
framework for social explanation, and so when applied to Indonesia, the central 
endeavor is to theorize the application of power (in all its dimensions) in a way that 
can explain the variation across time and space in interest articulation. This task can be 
illustrated in the context of natural resource extraction in the era of decentralization. 
The exploitation of natural resources by oligarchs is common throughout the
66 The Lukes critique reveals a subtle distinction between Winters's and Hadiz and Robison's 
understanding of power and interest. Winters explicitly understands power in terms of the "power 
resources" approach; see Winters, Oligarchy, p. 6. This approach intends to transcend debates over the 
nature of power rooted in the behavioralist tradition, such that the third dimension of power is simply an 
"indirect strategly] for the rational deployment of power resources . . . "  Walter Korpi, "Power Resources 
Approach vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power," 
Sociological Theory 3,2 (1985): 41. However, the power resources approach makes clear and direct causal 
claims about the relationship between the strength of the Left and outcomes of interest such as the 
development of the welfare state; see Walter Korpi, "The Power Resources Approach," in The Welfare State 
Reader, ed. Christopher Pierson and Francis G. Castles (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 76-88. In fact, 
one logical implication of the power resources approach is that it is not possible to study the power of one 
type of actor in isolation, for outcomes depend on the relative distribution of power among actors (for 
Korpi: classes). Hadiz and Robison, unlike Winters, make no appeal to power resources theory.
67 Of course, the entire point of the Lukes critique is that those latent interests can never be observed, 
making the task of interest attribution (like the concept of power) an "essentially contested" one; Lukes, 
Power, pp. 124, 44—51.
68 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971).
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Indonesian archipelago. Yet, despite the common interest of oligarchs in discouraging 
(or suppressing, or eliminating) local resistance to resource exploitation, the local 
politics of resistance varies in readily apparent ways. Resistance to forest destruction 
and plantation development in Papua embraces a language of colonial occupation and 
common armed struggle that is absent in Kalimantan.69 For the resource extractors, this 
necessitates a range of different practices in Papua—even if violence, coercion, bribery, 
and domination are always present in some form in both contexts. The reasons for the 
differences between Papua and Kalimantan in this case are obvious. The theoretical 
point is that any critical analysis of resource extraction in contemporary Indonesia 
cannot be restricted to the interests of economic elites or oligarchs alone. Powerful 
economic actors with unparalleled wealth and material resources will attempt to shape 
local communities' understandings of their own interests, but the strategies that they 
must pursue to do so will vary predictably. That inquiry is squarely within the ambit 
of the pluralist tradition.
No one working in the oligarchic tradition would deny that there is important 
variation in politics and policymaking across local contexts in Indonesia. Hadiz has 
himself analyzed how local politics has developed in very different districts. Yet 
neither that analysis nor the theoretical apparatus of oligarchy provides a framework 
for building explanations for why or how politics varies. The historicist observation 
that politics varies as a result of local conditions is, of course, not falsifiable when so 
articulated. It is also imprecise. Which factors, under what conditions, explain what kinds 
of variation in local politics, with what kinds of consequences?70 Analyses following the 
pluralist tradition should certainly not embrace a conventional pluralist sociology that 
defines local politics as simple interest group competition, yet they are well placed to 
build accounts that can answer these questions.
Concluding Remarks
This essay has traced the development of pluralism as a framework for 
comparative analysis of political conflict in Indonesia. Mindful of the many trenchant 
critiques of the conventional pluralism of mid-twentieth-century North Atlantic 
political science, it has shown that the pluralist tradition has been largely abandoned as 
a grand theoretical project or paradigm in comparative politics, but that the tradition
69 For overviews, compare Longgena Ginting and Oliver Pye, "Resisting Agribusiness Development: The 
Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate in West Papua, Indonesia," ASE AS—Austrian Journal of South- 
East Asian Studies 6,1 (2013): 160-82; and Leslie Potter, "Dayak Resistance to Oil Palm Plantations in West 
Kalimantan, Indonesia," presented at the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies 
Association of Australia, Melbourne, July 1-3, 2008, available at http:/ / artsonline.monash. edu.au/ mai/ 
files/ 2012/ 07/ lesleypotter.pdf.
70 One interesting contrast that is richly described, but not theorized explicitly, is in the different political 
success in East Java and North Sumatra of various thugs and goons whose power dates to the New Order 
period. In East Java, the "New Order's former enforcers have notably thrived less in their forays into local 
politics than their counterparts in North Sumatra." Hadiz, Localising Power, p. 116. Some explanations for 
the relative failure and success of various candidates proposed in this discussion include the traditional 
strength of Nahdlatul Ulama in East Java (which alters the nature of competition among local thugs by 
changing the balance of power among paramilitary groups), different histories of youth gangs in Medan 
versus Surabaya, and different kinds of military involvement in the criminal underworld; see ibid., pp. 
133-42 and especially pp. 139-40.
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survives in the analysis of distributional politics. It has further argued that a critical 
pluralism provides a useful framework for understanding Indonesian politics, even 
recognizing the striking inequality of material wealth and political power that 
characterize Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. This argument rejects the typological 
theorizing of what I have called the "modified pluralisms" of New Order political 
economy, and places particular emphasis on causal explanation as a central endeavor 
for Indonesian political studies.
This argument is a challenge to approaches to Indonesian politics that emphasize 
oligarchy as the central analytical framework. To reiterate the points of tension 
elaborated above, the challenge is not to Winters's definition of oligarchy as the politics 
of wealth defense and his conceptualization of how oligarchy varies across time and 
space, or to Hadiz and Robison's central insight that powerful elites have survived 
Indonesia's democratization and decentralization and harnessed new institutional 
arrangements to protect their interests. Rather, critical pluralism challenges the 
explanatory capacity of these frameworks. In reviewing basic issues confronting 
scholars of material wealth and political conflict in contemporary Indonesia—the 1997- 
98 financial meltdown and subsequent collapse of the New Order, money politics and 
elite continuity in local elections, the exploitation of natural resources, and so forth—I 
have shown the limits of the oligarchy approach as a framework of analysis and the 
utility of a critical pluralist approach. These topical areas are precisely those in which 
an approach based on oligarchy, which is tightly attuned to the effects of material 
wealth (and its extraordinarily uneven distribution) on Indonesian politics, should be 
most useful. That oligarchy does not provide the analytical framework to make sense 
of these problems should be seen as a challenge to those who rely on oligarchy as a 
focal lens when seeking to understand the Indonesian case. It also has clear 
implications for the comparative utility of the oligarchy theses.
Critical pluralism does not only challenge oligarchy by providing competing 
explanations—derived from a close attention to policy as the fundamental object of 
contestation—for fundamental issues in Indonesian politics. Critical pluralism also 
embodies a competing practice of knowledge production in which the task of causal 
explanation is a natural complement to theoretically informed description and 
conceptual development. Causal explanations require theories that link causal 
variables to outcomes of interest under properly delineated scope conditions, and 
which produce arguments that are subject to falsification. In this sense, the critical 
pluralism I have described in this essay contains a prescriptive statement about what 
the scientific analysis of power, conflict, and material inequality in Indonesia ought to 
become. It is not just that critical pluralism interprets Indonesian politics differently 
than do other approaches. Rather, the study of Indonesian politics must follow broader 
disciplinary advances in the social sciences, and adopt a more sophisticated toolkit for 
adjudicating among competing approaches and perspectives.
This conclusion should not obscure the commonalities between the pluralist 
tradition and oligarchic approaches. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the critical 
political economy approach of Hadiz, Robison, and others in the Murdoch school 
shares a basic insight with the most rationalist approaches to institutions in political
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science.71 That insight is that interests, not institutions, lie at the root of any coherent 
explanation of politics and policymaking. A progressive research program on the social 
foundations of Indonesian political economy will build on this common perspective on 
the root origins of political conflict. It will also take seriously the task of constructing 
explanations that can demonstrate the utility of interest-based explanations for 
capturing the great variation in the nature of political conflict and policy outcomes in 
unequal societies, such as Indonesia's.
71 Thomas B. Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," British Journal of 
Political Science (forthcoming 2013). A previous version of that essay circulated under the title "Rochester 
and Murdoch in Kuala Lumpur." Compare this to the critique of naive institutionalism in Vedi R. Hadiz, 
"Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives," 
Development and Change 35,4 (2004): 697-718.
